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GENETIC INFORMATION AND THIRD PARTY
ACCESS TO INFORMATION: NEW JERSEY'S
PIONEERING LEGISLATION AS A MODEL
FOR FEDERAL PRIVACY PROTECTION OF
GENETIC INFORMATION
Natalie Anne Stepanuk
Our genes determine who we are: our physical characteristics, our pre-
dispositions to and fortifications from particular diseases, and, as many
researchers now believe, our individual personality traits! Although
there has been great progress in the field of genetics,2 only recently have
+ J.D. candidate, May 1999, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See Sonia M. Suter, Note, Whose Genes Are These Anyway?: Familial Conflicts
over Access to Genetic Information, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1856-57 (1993).
Genes are located in the nucleus of each of the one hundred thousand billion cells in the
human body. See Janet A. Kobrin, Comment, Confidentiality of Genetic Information, 30
UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1286 (1983). Genes are comprised of nucleic acids, Ribonucleic
Acid and Deoxyribonucleic Acid, and are carried by chromosomes. See id. at 1286 n.23.
Twenty-three pairs of chromosomes comprise the human genome, one set inherited from
the mother and the other set from the father. See Richard A. Bornstein, Note, Genetic
Discrimination, Insurability and Legislation: A Closing of the Legal Loopholes, 4 J.L. &
POL'Y 551, 555 & n.19 (1996); see also Suter, supra, at 1856 & n.12. Chromosome pairs
contain the identical number and sequence of genes as its partner. See Kobrin, supra, at
1256. The genes carried within these chromosomes dictate a person's genetic structure
and physical appearance. See Suter, supra, at 1856-57. Each body or human cell performs
a specific function, thereby utilizing only a specific portion of the genetic information con-
tained within its nucleus. See id. at 1856.
Genetic defects can occur in several different ways. See Kobrin, supra, at 1287. For ex-
ample, a genetic sequence transmitted from a parent that lacks the proper genetic coding
can affect the chromosomes. See id. A mutation in a parent's gene can cause a single gene
disorder, which scientists now know causes disorders like sickle cell anemia and cystic fi-
brosis. See id. The interaction of more than one miscoded gene can cause a polygenic dis-
order such as spina bifida. See id. at 1288-89. Finally, variations in number or structure of
the chromosomes can cause a disorder such as Down's Syndrome. See id. at 1289.
Scientific research indicates that more than 5,000 disorders are genetically related. See
Bornstein, supra, at 557-58. Many disorders are caused by the genetic defects as described
above, but others may result from a genetic predisposition to the disease. See id. An in-
herited genetic disorder carries a greater probability than a mere predisposition to genetic
disease that the disease will develop. See id. at 558 n.31. Beyond genetic diseases, person-
ality traits, such as alcoholism and shyness, have been linked to particular genes. See id. at
559 n.37.
2. See Genetics Hearing Before the Labor HHS Committee: Hearing on S. 1694 Be-
fore the Senate Comm. On Labor, 104th Cong., July 25, 1996, available in 1996 WL 421688
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scientists begun to unravel the mystery of the human genome, which con-
tains the genetic information of an individual's past and future.3 Answers
to elusive questions and ties between human genetics and disease are to-
day discovered on almost a daily basis.' Modem research concentrates
on sequencing the human genome and unraveling the genetic code to
discover information about the causes of genetic defects and diseases
(Statement of Olympia Snowe) [hereinafter Snowe]; see also Helen R. Bergman, Com-
ment, Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 127, 127
(1992) (discussing the pace of scientific research, the resulting medical advances and the
developing ethical dilemmas left to encounter); Bornstein, supra note 1, at 557 (stating
that genetic disorders affect approximately half of the current U.S. population).
3. See Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Comment, Genetic Information and Property
Theory, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1037, 1041 n.16 (1993). In 1983, scientists knew the locations
of only 606 genes; however, by 1993, the location of more than 5,000 more genes had been
determined. See id.
Discovering the location of individual genes is essential in developing a map of the hu-
man genome, which is the compilation of a person's total genetic information. See LEROY
WALTERS & JULIE GAGE PALMER, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN GENE THERAPY 4 (1997);
see also infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text (discussing the Human Genome Project,
an attempt to decode the human genome).
4. See Charles Craig, Genomes Progressing Rapidly, But to What End?, BIOWORLD
TODAY, May 22, 1997, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnews File (discussing the
rapid advancements in human genomics science). From 1986 to 1992, sixteen disease
genes were located, and in 1993 alone, seventeen disease genes were found. See id.; see
also Burk Burnett, Comment, Genetic Discrimination: Legislation Required to Keep Se-
crets, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 502, 512 (1997) (stating that "[r]apid advancements in ge-
netic technology compelled redefinition of many of the initial goals" of the human genome
project). This evolving source of knowledge will most likely change the entire course of
modern medicine. See id.; Snowe, supra note 2 ("Who could have predicted 20 years ago
that scientists today could accurately identify the genes associated with cystic fibrosis, can-
cer, and Alzheimers disease? Today, scientists can, and as a result doctors are increasingly
able to identify predispositions to certain diseases based on the results of genetic test-
ing.").
Genetic "linkage studies" are helping to increase the pace of genetic information by al-
lowing more individuals to learn about their predispositions to certain diseases. See Alex-
ander Morgan Capron, Which Ills to Bear?: Reevaluating the "Threat" of Modern Genetics,
39 EMORY L.J. 665, 686-89 (1990) (discussing the current practices of genetic screening);
see also Bornstein, supra note 1, at 558-59 (highlighting the utility of genetic testing as well
as the recent advances in genetic science).
5. See Alexandra K. Glazier, Genetic Predispositions, Prophylactic Treatments and
Private Health Insurance: Nothing Is Better Than a Good Pair of Genes, 23 AM. J.L. &
MED. 45, 45-46 (1997); see also J. Madeleine Nash, To Know Your Own Fate, TIME, Apr.
3, 1995, at 62 (commenting on the need for improved testing for Alzheimer's disease be-
cause there is not yet a medical cure). Although currently more than four million people
in the United States suffer from Alzheimer's disease, scientists developed solid theories
about the progression of the disease only recently. See id. Alzheimer's has no cure yet,
and presently only one drug, Tacrine, is FDA approved for use against the disease. See id.
However, even Tacrine only temporarily eases symptoms and is not intended as a long-
term treatment. See id.
Scientists have also identified a genetic link to the cause of allergies, which presently af-
fect 40 to 50 million Americans each year. See Charles W. Henderson, Allergy: Scientists
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Through genetic sequencing techniques, scientists are deciphering pat-
terns of genetic information contained within deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA), which encodes proteins and physical processes within the human
body.6 Scientists already are able to explain the origin of a disease such
as breast cancer, by identifying the specific genetic defect which causes
it.7 A direct link between Alzheimer's disease and the Apo E4 gene has
also recently been discovered.8 Most genetic defects, however, do not yet
have cures, leaving individuals with difficult decisions about genetic
testing, which could give them an early indication of an incurable dis-
9
ease.
Identify a Strong Genetic Link to Allergies, GENE THERAPY WKLY., Jan. 5, 1998, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnews File. The genetic mutation found will make it easier to
identify individuals susceptible to allergies and will eventually aid in the development of
more effective treatments. See id.
6. See James D. Watson, The Human Genome Project: Past, Present and Future, 248
SCi. 44, 44 (1990). Once the DNA can be completely deciphered, scientists hope to gain a
better understanding of the underpinnings of human existence. See id. The Human Ge-
nome Project's ultimate goal is to facilitate scientific understanding of disease progression.
See id.; see also James D. Watson & Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, The Human Genome
Project and International Health, 263 JAMA 3322, 3322 (1990).
The main benefit of the Human Genome Project will be revolutionary knowledge about
the diseases that affect humankind on a global level. See id. Currently, however, medical
technology cannot effectively detect disease or increased susceptibility to disease. See
ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS 1 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994). Therefore, there is an
increased pressure to broaden both the screening programs and genetic tests. See id. at 2.
7. See Gina Kolata, Research Links Single Gene to Almost All Breast Cancers, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1995, at Al (discussing the isolation of the breast cancer gene as a new dis-
covery resource); see also Breast Cancer in Young Tied to Faulty Gene, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 1996, at A19 (stating that a defect in the gene BRCA1 is linked to breast cancer in
women with a family history of breast cancer, as well as, those women in their later twen-
ties and early thirties without a family history of breast cancer); cf. Barbara L. Weber et
al., Familial Breast Cancer: Approaching the Isolation of a Susceptibility Gene, 74 CANCER
1013, 1018 (1994) (commenting that the identification and isolation of the BRCA1 gene
will soon lead to the widespread availability of screening, allowing for women to detect
their risk of developing the disease).
Women who are genetically tested for breast cancer need to remain cautious because a
negative result does not erase the possibility of developing breast cancer. See Charlene
Laino, Should You Be Genetically Tested? (visited Jan. 24, 1998) <http://www.
msnbc.com/news/116977.asp>. According to the Chief of Clinical Genetic Services at
Memorial Sloan-Kettering in New York, "a negative breast-cancer test result will give
women a false sense of security." See id. The reason for this is that the majority of breast
cancers are not caused by a defective gene. See id.
8. See Gina Kolata, If Tests Hint Alzheimer's Should a Patient Be Told?, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at Al; see also Nash, supra note 5, at 62 (describing problems en-
countered in the past with diagnosing Alzheimer's disease and recognizing the renewed
hope of a more precise test).
9. See Glazier, supra note 5, at 45 n.1 (explaining that early detection is deceptive
because instead of prolonging life, it merely increases the length of time the individual is
aware of the illness). Studies comparing the survival percentages from the time of diagno-
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As technology advances, courts and legislatures lag behind, unpre-
pared to answer the innumerable legal questions raised by genetic re-
search.10 Although legislative proposals to regulate the use of genetic in-
formation and genetic testing have arisen in both the United States
sis have been conducted to determine the effectiveness of early detection. See id. The de-
veloping genetic technology can potentially confuse or harm the public by creating the be-
lief that an early diagnosis eradicates disease. See William C. Black & H. Gilbert Welch,
Advances in Diagnostic Imaging and Overestimations of Disease Prevalence and the Bene-
fits of Therapy, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1237, 1237, 1239-42 (1993). In reality, for most
diseases, early detection garners little benefit. See id.
Studies on early genetic defect diagnosis have revealed a phenomenon known as "lead
time bias." See Glazier, supra note 5, at 45 n.1. Lead time bias denotes the fact that one's
life span after early detection of disease is typically the same as if it were detected later in
its progression; the individual usually will die at the same age. See id.; see also Black &
Welch, supra, at 1239-42 (defining "lead-time bias" in genetic disease detection).
A recent Johns Hopkins University study showed "that doctors misinterpreted the ge-
netic test results in nearly one-third of patients who were tested for a colon cancer gene."
See Charlene Laino, Protect Against Gene Discrimination-Group Calls for Patient Safe-
guards (visited Jan. 24, 1998) <http//:www.msnbc.com/ news/63631.asp>. The results of
this study have led to calls for patient safeguards from the National Action Plan on Breast
Cancer (NAPBC). See id. The NAPBC's position is that the medical community cannot
wholly rely on information from the genetic researchers, but rather must participate in the
synthesis of the information when forming their own understanding. See National Action
Plan on Breast Cancer & American Society of Clinical Oncology, Hereditary Susceptibility
to Breast and Ovarian Cancer: An Outline of the Basic Fundamental Knowledge Needed by
All Health Care Professionals (visited Jan. 24, 1998) <http://www.napbc.org/napbc
/hsedcurr.htm#potential>.
10. See Kathy L. Hudson et al., Genetic Discrimination and Health Insurance: An Ur-
gent Need for Reform (visited Jan. 24, 1998) <http://www.edoc.com/aaas/policy/gene-
tics.html>; see also Michael M.J. Lin, Note, Conferring a Federal Property Right in Genetic
Material: Stepping into the Future with the Genetic Privacy Act, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 109,
110 (1996) (stating that courts and legislatures have failed to establish a national policy for
regulating the use of genetic information and biological materials); cf Kobrin, supra note
1, at 1284 (claiming that genetic screening legislation has not been successful and suggest-
ing that courts have confused genetic information issues with the principles of tort law).
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House of Representatives" and the United States Senate,12 Congress has
failed to enact any substantial legislation. The passage of the Health In-
11. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997,
H.R. 306, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Why We Need H.R. 306 (on file with author)
(finding that H.R. 306 was proposed in response to concerns that genetic information will
be used to prevent people from obtaining health insurance). H.R. 306, proposed by Rep-
resentative Slaughter, attempts to ensure that the public has access to their genetic infor-
mation without encountering discrimination by their insurance companies. See Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997, H.R. 306, 105th Cong.
(1997). This legislation is intended to close the legal loopholes remaining after the passage
of the Kennedy-Kassenbaum health care reform bill. See Letter from John Edward Porter
& Louise McIntosh Slaughter, Members of Congress, to Members of Congress (Sept. 12,
1996) (on file with author); see infra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the short-
comings of the Kennedy-Kassenbaum bill). The following are among the provisions in-
cluded in H.R. 306: (1) amendments to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA); (2) amendments to the Public Health Service Act; and (3) amendments to
the Internal Revenue Code. See Why We Need H.R. 306, supra. The combined purpose
of these amendments is to restrict health care plans from discriminating against those with
genetic defects. See id.
According to the proposed legislation, federal law is necessary to protect this informa-
tion because state laws can affect only state-regulated insurance companies, thereby ex-
cluding large, multi-state employers regulated under ERISA. See id. Because it only ad-
dresses genetic discrimination in health insurance, this legislation is not intended to impact
clinical trials or clinical research. See id.; see also Bornstein, supra note 1, at 579 (noting
that legislation protecting genetic information from insurers has not been enacted). On
January 7, 1997, H.R. 306 was referred to the Commerce, Ways and Means Committee,
and the Education in the Workforce Committee for consideration. See Bill Summary &
Status for the 105th Congress (on file with author) [hereinafter H.R. 306 Bill Summary &
Status]. As of the date of this article, H.R. 306 remains in committee, with hearings and
mark-ups yet to be scheduled. See id. There have been six bills proposed to Congress
which would protect this information from insurers, yet congressional action has not been
forthcoming. See Bornstein, supra note 1, at 587.
12. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997, S.
89, 105th Cong. (1997). The Act is the pending Senate legislation which prohibits dis-
crimination against individuals on the basis of genetic information. See id. This bill, intro-
duced by Senator Snowe from Maine, has been read twice, as of the date of this article,
and referred to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources. See Bill Summary &
Status for the 105th Congress (visited Jan. 24, 1998) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. Little prog-
ress has been made on the legislation, as it has been pending in the Senate since the 104th
Congress. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997, S.
1694, 104th Cong. (1996); see also Snowe, supra note 2 (urging the Senate Labor Commit-
tee to support the Senate bill, S. 1694).
13. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997;
H.R. 306, 105th Cong. (1997); supra note 11; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text
(discussing the status of proposed protective genetic legislation in the U.S. House and
Senate). It is likely, however, that the 105th Congress could address the issue of human
cloning, an issue that is closely related to the use of genetic information and testing, as
early as 1998. See Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act, H.R. 922, 105th Cong.
(1997).
Representative Ehlers (R-Mich.) introduced the Human Cloning Research Prohibition
Act to the House of Representatives on March 5, 1997. See id. This bill prohibits the use
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surance, Portability and Accountability Act in 1996, more commonly
known as the Kennedy-Kassenbaum Bill, marks the indirect beginning of
congressional involvement with genetic information regulation. 4 Al-
though this Act contains a provision which prohibits the classification of
genetic predispositions as preexisting conditions by insurance companies,
the provision is narrow in scope and neglects many of the present and
developing concerns about the use and abuse of genetic information.
Notably, the provision fails to address important issues, such as manda-
tory genetic testing by insurance companies used to determine eligibility
for coverage and the maintenance of confidentiality of the results of ge-
netic testing.16 The provision also leaves many avenues of genetic dis-
crimination unprotected. 7
of federal funding for conducting or supporting research on the cloning of humans. See id.
Presently, the bill has been referred to committees on Science and Commerce for hearings
and revisions. See Bill Summary & Status for the 105th Congress (visited Jan. 17, 1998)
<http://thomas loc.gov>.
The rapid action occurring on H.R. 922, as opposed to the inaction on H.R. 306, is
largely in response to the first successful cloning of the sheep "Dolly." See European
Countries Sign Human Cloning Ban, STAR TRIB., (MINN.-ST. PAUL), Jan. 13, 1998, at 1A.
The physicist responsible for the cloning, Ian Wilmut, prompted the interest of Dr. Rich-
ard Seed who now attempts to clone human beings, an idea which received immediate
condemnation in the United States and a strict banning in nineteen European Nations.
See id.; Guy Gugliotta, United Against Human Cloning, Hill Leaders Differ on Specifics,
WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1998, at A4. President Clinton called the cloning of humans "pro-
foundly troubling" and "morally unacceptable," and he urged rapid congressional action
against its success. See id. Internationally, nineteen nations signed a treaty outlawing hu-
man cloning. See id. A medical ethicist in Paris described human cloning as a "an insult to
human rights." See id. In Britain, where sheep were cloned, leaders refused to sign the
treaty claiming that it was too harsh. See id. By contrast, Germany refused to sign the
treaty claiming it was too lenient. See id.
14. See The Health Coverage Availability and Affordability Act of 1996, H.R. 3103,
104th Cong., § 101 (1996) (prohibiting health care eligibility decisions to be based on
health-status-related conditions and stating that genetic information cannot be considered
in the absence of an actual diagnosis of the genetic disease).
Many critics believe that this bill is insufficient because it is too limited. See Karen
Rothenberg, Genetic Testing Raises Real Fears of Molecular Discrimination, THE TAMPA
TRIBUNE-TIMES, Aug. 3, 1997, at 1. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 prohibits insurers from using genetic information to establish rules for eligi-
bility and it prevents the use of genetic information about a person's predisposition to a
disease as a basis for finding that the person has a preexisting condition. See id. However,
it does not prevent insurers from raising rates, excluding coverage altogether, or imposing
unlimited caps on coverage. See id. Moreover, the Act does nothing to prevent insurers
from requiring genetic testing, nor does it protect the confidentiality of the test results.
See id.
15. See Rothenberg, supra note 14, at 1 (discussing the shortcomings of the Kennedy-
Kassenbaum bill with respect to the use of genetic information regarding predisposition to
disease).
16. See id.
17. See H.R. 3103, supra note 14 (attempting to "improve portability and continuity
[Vol. 47:11051110
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Congress has failed to produce legislation regulating genetic informa-
tion; however, it currently funds a program to facilitate genetic re-
search.8 The Human Genome Project is a three billion dollar federally
funded, international program to decode the human genome.19 Se-
quencing the human genome is the primary goal of the project, yet
mechanisms also must be created to help society assimilate the informa-
tion obtained from such genetic research.20  In an attempt to develop
of health insurance coverage"); see also infra notes 53-76 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the various existing forms of abuse of genetic information, such as mandatory genetic
testing, employment discrimination, and ethical societal dilemmas).
18. See Anita LaFrance Allen, Genetic Testing, Nature and Trust, 27 SETON HALL L.
REV. 887, 887 (1997). The Human Genome Project began in the mid-1980s as a research
project coordinated between the National Institutes of Health and the Department of En-
ergy. See ROBERT MULLAN COOK-DEEGAN, THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT: THE
FORMULATION OF FEDERAL POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1986-1990, at 99 (Kathi
E. Hanna ed. 1991). Today, it is an international program working to localize the esti-
mated 50,000 to 100,000 genes within the human genome in an effort to create a detailed
reference for scientists around the world. See Allen, supra, at 887. This is a federally
funded program costing roughly 200 million dollars per year. See id. The projected goal is
to map the human genome by the year 2005. See VICTOR A. MCKUSICK, THE HUMAN
GENOME PROJECT: PLANS, STATUS, AND APPLICATIONS IN BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE 18
(George J. Annas et al. eds., 1992).
As of 1996, the project mapped the 23 pairs of human chromosomes along with more
than 15,000 DNA markers. See Charles Craig, Human Genome Project Accelerating
Ahead of Ethics, BIOWORLD TODAY, March 6,1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Curnews File. The project is presently ahead of schedule, having already sequenced frag-
ments of the human genome. See id.
Issues other than mapping the human genome surround this project. See Craig, supra
note 4. Specifically, concern has been expressed about the growing competition to decode
the genome by originators of the Human Genome Project. See id. Already two Genomics
Conferences have convened providing a forum for researchers to attract potential inves-
tors. See id. This growing financial activity raises issues as to the quality of objective re-
search and the goals of the project as well as disputes of patenting rights. See id.; see also
Private Genes, 146 N.J.L.J. 26 (1996) (discussing concerns on behalf of pharmaceutical
companies that individuals will demand royalties for the use of their genetic material); cf
Elizabeth Finkel, The Post-Genome Era: Medical Promise with Problems, THE LANCET,
Apr. 26, 1997, at 1228 (noting that new biotechnical companies have been started as a re-
sult of progress in genetic technology).
19. See Allen, supra note 18, at 887; see also P.L. Pearson et al., The Human Genome
Initiative-Do Databases Reflect Current Progress?, 254 SCIENCE 214, 214 (1991) (stating
that human genetic sequence data are complied internationally in three public databases
and a number of specialized research databases).
20. See generally Yank D. Coble, Jr., Prepared Statement of Yank D. Coble, Jr., M.D.
for the American Medical Association Before the House Committee on Commerce Task
Force on Health Records and Genetic Privacy, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, July 22, 1997
(stating that efforts to enact federal laws lag behind science and noting that the scientists
involved with the Human Genome Project have developed and published recommenda-
tions for policy makers to protect individuals from genetic discrimination).
The following recommendations were developed by Dr. Coble and the American Medi-
cal Association:
1111
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these assimilation mechanisms, the Human Genome Project's research-
ers analyze the practical effects of genetic information in our society.
2
'
The ethical, legal, and social implications of the project's work are stud-
ied contemporaneously as the scientific data is synthesized . Monitoring
the implications of sequencing the human genome is a necessary first
step in preparing social institutions, such as health care providers and in-
surers, to use this information.2'
As opposed to Congress, traditionally courts have relied on the use of
genetic information as a sentencing guideline in both civil and criminal
litigation, providing a narrow body of case law on the issue.24 Genetic in-
(1) Prohibit insurers from establishing rates based on genetic information;
(2) Prohibit insurers from making coverage decisions based on genetic informa-
tion;
(3) Prohibit insurers from requesting or requiring collection or disclosure of ge-
netic information;
(4) Prohibit any holder of genetic information (including insurance companies)
from releasing that information without prior written consent from the individ-
ual.
See id.
21. See Ethical, Legal and Social Implications (ELSI): High Priority Areas, (visited
August 28, 1997) <http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/AboutNHGRI/Der/Elsi/high-priority.
html#Research> (detailing the "high priority" areas for current ELSI research). There are
several areas of concern include: (1) promoting privacy and fairness in the use of genetic
information; (2) education of health care professionals in the use of genetic technologies;
(3) targeting issues surrounding genetic research such as informed consent; and (4) pro-
moting public and professional education. See id.
22. See id. Mapping the human genome raises questions as to how medicine will be
practiced in the future and how to balance the immense capability of reading the human
body while maintaining autonomous choice and protecting a "genetically bare" and vul-
nerable human body. See John C. Fletcher & Dorothy C. Wertz, Ethics, Law, and Medical
Genetics: After the Human Genome Is Mapped, 39 EMORY L.J. 747, 747-48 (1990).
23. See Coble, supra note 20 (listing the American Medical Association's recommen-
dations as to the means by which state and federal policy makers should protect individu-
als against genetic discrimination).
24. See United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 791-93 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting the sig-
nificance of DNA in the human composition and describing the significance of DNA test-
ing in criminal procedures); Dorothy Nelkin, After Daubert: The Relevance and Reliability
of Genetic Information, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 2119 (1994) (discussing the use of genetic
information in the courtroom).
In DNA forensic analysis, portions of the DNA structure take different forms in differ-
ent individuals creating areas called polymorphism. See Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 791. Poly-
morphisms are significant in DNA forensic testing because, by focusing on specific por-
tions of them, scientists establish a percentage of individuals who are likely to have the
same DNA structure. See id. Scientists unravel the DNA structure, thereby breaking it
into shorter fragments, and eventually splitting into two single strands of DNA. See id. at
792. A single strand is attracted to other complimentary strands, which then gravitate to-
ward each other and connect to form a double helix model. See id. This process is called
"hybridization." See id. A genetic probe is constructed by scientists during hybridization,
which seeks out and locks onto complimentary strands, thereby locating the polymorphic
1112 [Vol. 47:1105
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formation has been relied on in the courtroom in a variety of situations,
including DNA forensic testing and child custody disputes. 5
Genetic information also has been used in criminal law as a mitigating
factor in determining punishment." Courts have viewed defendants ge-
netically predisposed to commit crime as purportedly lacking free will."
Thus, some courts take a defendant's genetic make-up into account dur-
ing sentencing.
Outside of the sentencing proceedings, courts have provided little
guidance on the use or regulation of genetic information.2 Modern case
strands of DNA. See id. Once this process is complete, the FBI calculates the statistical
significance of a match between two DNA profiles using tools from the field of human
population genetics. See id. at 793. This technique has been deemed reliable evidence in
judicial proceedings. See id. at 799-800 (finding forensic analysis acceptable where it is
shown to be reliable).
25. See Nelkin, supra note 24, at 2120. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmarcuticals
Inc., the United States Supreme Court dealt with admissibility standards regarding the use
of scientific information in the courtroom. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In Daubert, the Court de-
fined some indicators of scientific reliability, including whether the evidence has been
tested, subjected to peer review and publication, derived through a set of standards with a
known error rate, and is generally accepted in the scientific community. See id. at 593-94.
In the courtroom, genetic information is typically used for DNA forensic testing; however
its uses are increasing to family relationships and criminal responsibility. See Nelkin, su-
pra note 24, at 2120.
In child custody cases, courts have shifted from focusing on "the best interests of the
child" to a reliance on genetic information to dispute the importance of genetic and emo-
tional bonds. See id. (exemplifying the use of genetic information in child custody disputes
and noting the inconsistency of judicial decisions on the issue). Instead of relying solely on
testimony establishing that one parent provides a better home for the child than the other,
courts now also consider genetic testimony indicating personality traits. See id. at 2020-21.
26. See Nelkin, supra note 24, at 2121 (stating that genetic information is used as
guidance in decisions concerning responsibility and punishment). Genetic information is
used as the basis for a defense and in order to mitigate punishment under the claim that
genetic predispositions preclude free will. See id. at 2021. For example, Positron Emission
Tomography (PET) scans have been allowed in court as a way to determine sanity. See
Cerisse Anderson, Brain Scan Deemed Admissible at Trial: Guilty Plea Follows Insanity
Defense Ruling, 208 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1992) (recounting the trial of a man accused of strangling
his wife and throwing her out the window of their twelfth floor apartment).
27. See Nelkin, supra note 24, at 2120. Genetic information often guides criminal
cases because the growing body of research has suggested connections between genetic
predisposition and violence. See id. at 2123. Therefore, genetic information provides a
background for decisions regarding responsibility and punishment. See id. at 2120. A ge-
netic explanation for behavior has relieved defendants from a degree of personal respon-
sibility for their actions. See id. at 2121-22 (recounting a disbarment proceeding in which
the court accepted a genetic predisposition to alcoholism defense as an excuse for misap-
propriation of funds and mitigated punishment based on the genetic predisposition).
28. See Lin, supra note 10, at 110 (noting that very few cases address property rights
in a person's genetic material); see also Bertram I. Rowland, Legal Implications of Letter
Licenses for Biotechnology, 1 HIGH TECH. L.J. 99, 129 (1986) (stating that commerce re-
lated to biological material will proceed cautiously due to the legal instability in this area).
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law does not address the concerns of access to and discrimination in the
use of genetic information.29 A significant case related to the use of ge-
netic information is Moore v. Regents of the University of California,3 °
where the California Supreme Court, in denying a claim for conversion
of bodily tissue, held that cells were abandoned once they were removed
from the plaintiff's body.3 There is little case law that directly addresses
32genetic information. However, in Mayfield v. Dalton,33 the Ninth circuit
was asked to determine the constitutionality of a requirement that
United States marines provide blood and tissue samples to the federal
government for future DNA testing.34 The District Court below granted
the government's Motion for Summary Judgment on the theory that
stored DNA would help to identify a soldier's remains.35 The appellate
court denied the appeal as moot and both plaintiffs were honorably dis-
charged.36
Apart from the legislative and judicial forums, much of the apprehen-
sion regarding the use of genetic information arises from possible dis-
crimination fears, such as higher insurance premiums, increased risk of
employment termination, and public disclosure of genetic information.37
29. See Lin, supra note 10, at 110.
30. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
31. See id. at 488-89. John Moore, suffering from hairy cell leukemia, underwent sur-
gery for the removal of his enlarged spleen. See id. at 480-81. Moore recovered from the
cancer, but continued to return for evaluations at the request of his doctor, who used
Moore's tissue, blood, bone marrow, and other samples in order to continue research on
his cancer. See id. at 481. A cell line, worth $3.01 billion, was established from the use of
Moore's samples and the Regents of the University of California obtained a patent. See
id. at 481-82. Moore brought suit against the doctors and the University claiming unlawful
conversion of bodily property and lack of informed consent. See id. at 482. The California
Supreme Court ruled against Moore on the ground that allowing him to retain an interest
in the cells would hinder scientific research. See id. at 494-95.
32. See Lin, supra note 10, at 110.
33. 109 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1997).
34. See id. at 1424; see also Lori Andrews, Body Science, 83 A.B.A. J. 44, 46 (1997)
(stating that the Marines argued that the mandatory testing constituted a Fourth Amend-
ment search and seizure violation); Concerns About Privacy of Military Specimens Are
Addressed, Court Says, BIOTECHNOLOGY, Apr. 11, 1997, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Curnews File (highlighting the 9th circuit opinion in Mayfield and stating that the
Marines feared that the military would abuse their genetic information);
35. See Mayfield v. Dalton, 109 F.3d 1423,1425 (9th Cir. 1997).
36. See id.
37. See Why We Need H.R. 306, supra note 11; see also Leslie P. Francis, Recent De-
velopments in Genetic Diagnosis: Some Ethical and Legal Implications, 1986 UTAH L.
REV. 483, 488 (discussing concerns about abuse of genetic information by employers, in-
surers, and the health care system); Steven Brostoff, Clinton Calls for Ban on Using Ge-
netic Test Data; Health Insurance Groups Differ in Reaction to President Clinton's Pro-
posal, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH-FINANCIAL SERVICES ED., July 21,
1114 [Vol. 47:1105
1998] Model for Federal Privacy Protection of Genetic Information
Genetic discrimination is defined as discrimination against an individual
based solely on the differences between the "defective" genetic composi-
tion of the individual and the perceived "normal" gene." An informal,
1996 study determined that nearly half of the respondents suffering from
various forms of genetic disease experienced some form of genetic dis-
crimination.39 Health care insurance and employment discrimination are
among the immediate concerns related to the expanded knowledge of
genetic information; however, the list has evolved to now include blanket
societal discrimination.40 Psychological stress caused by the option of ge-
netic testing and the growing potential for familial conflicts are other ef-
41fects of the advancing technology.
Without federal or judicial guidance, state legislatures have taken the
initiative by protecting the use of genetic information and genetic test-
42ing. Unfortunately, most state legislation fails to address both present
and potential legal ramifications, thereby increasing the need for national
1997, at 3 (recounting statements of President Clinton calling for legislation barring health
insurers from using genetic information to deny coverage or increase premiums). The
Health Insurance Association of America opposed Clinton's plan because it would ad-
versely affect healthy individuals by increasing rates across the board. See id. The Asso-
ciation's president, Karen Ignagni, stated, "it is critically important to guarantee that
health care services for people with genetic illnesses are effectively coordinated and that
those providing health care to these individuals have the information needed for the high-
est quality of care." Id; see also Patricia King, The Past as Prologue: Race, Class and Gene
Discrimination, GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS As GUIDES 94, 95-108
(George J. Annas & Sherman Elias eds., 1992) (analyzing the correlation between race
and genetic discrimination). In order for all of society to benefit from emerging genetic
information, there must be a massive overhaul of our existing health care system and the
"policy implications of differences among human beings" must be taken into account. Id.
at 107.
38. See Marvin R. Natowicz et al., Genetic Discrimination and the Law, 50 AM. J.
HUMAN GENETICS 465,466 (1992).
39. See Rosemary Orthmann, Study Reveals Cases of Genetic Bias, LAW & POLICY
REPORTER, June 1996, at 85. Four genetic disorders, were thc focus of this study to which
roughly 455 people responded. See id. The most common sources of discrimination:
health and life insurance companies. See id.; see also Snowe, supra note 2; Poll Shows
Dark Side of Genetic Research, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 25, 1996, at A5.
40. See Hudson, supra note 10 (giving examples of health care and employment dis-
crimination, as well as societal discrimination).
41. See Suter, supra note 1, at 1855-56 (discussing the psychological effects of genetic
testing).
42. Genetic legislation has been enacted in the following states: ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 20-448 (West & Supp. 1995); CAL. CIv. CODE § 56.17 (West Supp. 1998); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40 (West Supp. 1996); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 33-54-1 to 8 (1996); MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 223 (Supp. 1996); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 72A.139 (West Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-206 (1997); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 141-H:1 to 6 (Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN., § 10:5-43 to -49 (West
Supp. 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1751.63-1751.65 (Anderson 1997); OR. REV
STAT. §§ 659.700- 659.720 (1995); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 631.89 (West 1995).
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legislation. State legislation also exemplifies the increasing confusion
concerning the level of constitutional protection genetic information
should receive." Specifically, the controversy involves the issue of
whether genetic information is or should be classified as a privacy right
or a property right.
The Genetic Privacy Act of 1996,45 passed by the New Jersey Legisla-
ture, is an exception to the general inadequacy of state legislation.46
Commentators have heralded the New Jersey legislation as one of the
broadest state measures that offers protection on a variety of levels and
acknowledges the political, moral, and social significance of genetic in-
formation.47 Due to its comprehensiveness, New Jersey's legislation has
also been labeled by commentators as a model for other states and the
nation.48
This Comment examines the classification of genetic information as a
property and privacy right. Specifically, this Comment provides a practi-
cal analysis of New Jersey's Genetic Privacy Act to determine whether it
is a model for a national policy. Part I examines the abbreviated legisla-
tive history of the Act, focusing on the deletion of property rights in ge-
netic information. Part I also demonstrates the breadth of New Jersey's
statute by way of illustrations of how this information is misused. Part II
analyzes the competing property and privacy interests involved in access
to genetic information, focusing on the ramifications of these interests in
a national policy. This Comment then suggests that the classification of
genetic information as a property or privacy right should not be the focus
of a national policy. Rather, it suggests that Congress should enact leg-
43. See Philip Reilly, New Jersey Genetic Privacy Act, 1 THE GENE LETTER 1, 3
(July 1, 1996) <http://www.geneletter.org/0796/njprivacyact.html> (stating that the major-
ity of law concerning genetic testing and information focuses on preventing health insur-
ance discrimination and does not include protection against other forms of discrimina-
tion).
44. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text (discussing the dilemma facing state
legislatures as they attempt to protect genetic information while maintaining a high level
of scientific research).
45. 1996 N.J. ch. 126; §17B:30-12.
46. See Burnett, supra note 4, at 525-26; see also infra notes 82-89 and accompanying
text (discussing the breadth of the New Jersey statute in relation to more restrictive stat-
utes enacted in other states).
47. See New Jersey: Governor Signs Genetic Privacy Act, HEALTH LINE, Nov. 20,
1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnews File; see also Burnett, supra note 4, at
525 (claiming that New Jersey's Genetic Privacy Act is "one of the most comprehensive
measures in protecting against genetic discrimination in the nation"). New Jersey's legis-
lation surpasses protective bills pending in other states because of its heightened stan-
dards. See Burnett, supra note 4, at 526 (footnote omitted).
48. See supra note 47 (describing the comprehensive nature of the legislation).
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islation that adequately addresses the complexity and uniqueness of ge-
netic information without limiting its focus to classifying the nature of the
right. This Comment also asserts that issues surrounding genetic infor-
mation transcend science and medicine, and travel to the core of what it
means to be human. This Comment concludes that these issues are po-
litically, ethically, morally, and practically significant and should not be
addressed piecemeal by the courts or indiscriminately by state legisla-
tures.
I. GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
Controlling the use of genetic information is essential because genetic
discrimination affects all aspects of society, revealing fundamental com-
ponents of what differentiates one human from another and thereby
opening the door to numerous forms of discrimination.49 The most obvi-
ous and perhaps the most active areas of discrimination are insurance
coverage and employment.0 Social discrimination potentially may result
from unfair insurance and employment practices." As research pro-
gresses, the potential for discrimination similarly heightens.
A. Insurance Discrimination
Presently, insurance companies are free to charge higher premiums or
even to cancel coverage for individuals with preexisting health conditions
49. See Why We Need H.R. 306, supra note 11; Phil Bereano, Don't Take Liberties
with Our Genes, THE SEATTLE TIMES, July 17, 1997, at B5 (discussing the effects of the
public "discourse" on genetic information). Science and technology are not "value-
neutral." Id. It is feared that "predictability will replace a tolerance for natural variation
and diversity." See id. Further, society's growing fascination with genetic research and
human health has the potential to cause the neglect of other health factors. See id. For
example, a connection between environmental factors and cancers had been established.
See id. However, if cancer becomes recognized as a purely genetic disease, efforts to im-
prove the environment may be completely disregarded. See id. Social conditions such as
poverty, which contribute to high mortality rates, will also become less important as peo-
ple are faulted for having defective genes. See id.
50. See Allen, supra note 18 (naming employment discrimination and health insur-
ance barriers as outgrowths of human genetic research); see also infra notes 53-66 and ac-
companying text (exploiing the health care and employment issues surrounding the use of
genetic information).
51. See King, supra note 37, at 95 (expressing skepticism as to whether the informa-
tion obtained from the Human Genome Project will be beneficial to all members of our
society). As correlations between genetic diseases and race are discovered, there is a pos-
sibility that racial discrimination and stereotyping will increase. See id.; see also infra notes
67-76 and accompanying text (elaborating on the growing fear of societal discrimination
resulting from the abuse of genetic information).
52. See King, supra note 37, at 95.
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as a "cost-control" measure. 3 In the absence of laws governing the use
of genetic testing, and making mandatory testing illegal, cost-control
measures may soon impact those inflicted with genetic illnesses or with
histories of genetic problems. 4 Stories about parents who are unable to
obtain insurance for their children because of a hereditary genetic de-
fect55 and insurance companies threatening to cancel insurance based on
the results of prenatal testing56 are surfacing with great frequency. Even-
tually, the entire population will have access to their genetic information
and as a result will be sorted into a particular genetic category.17 Since no
individual is genetically flawless, every person will be subjected to a
53. See Glazier, supra note 5, at 46 (stating that it is common practice for private
health insurance companies to refuse coverage for preexisting conditions).
The definition of "preexisting condition" has been expanded by state and federal law to
include conditions for which there is no affirmative diagnosis. See id. at 60. This insurance
exclusion has frequently been litigated in cases of workers' compensation claims. See id. at
59. This litigation has created a trend toward expanding the definition of "preexisting
condition." See id. For instance, courts have held that even preexisting illnesses which
are diagnosed after insurance policies become effective are excluded from coverage. See
Kirk v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 942 F.2d 504, 508 (8th Cir. 1991).
54. See Catherine Arnst, Concerns Grow About Insurance Bias Based On Genetic
Testing, REUTERS NORTH AMERICAN WIRE, Sept. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Curnews File (reporting that larger companies in the United States and Europe
presently eliminate job applicants whose genetic screens indicate a high risk for disease).
Scientists are concerned that expectant parents will be forced to allocate risks when they
learn that an unborn child has a genetic predisposition for disease. See id. Another fear is
that coverage will be denied before pregnancy on the basis of the parents' genetic testing.
See id.
55. See Bornstein, supra note 1, at 566. A woman with a family history of
Huntington's disease was unable to obtain health insurance for herself or her children un-
til she tested negative for the gene. See id. The protein HAP1 is thought to interact with
the Huntington's disease gene which triggers the reactions that kills brain cells. See id.
Huntington's disease results in brain atrophy, eventually causing loss of bodily functions
and ultimate death. See id. at 559 n.37.
56. See Ted Peters, In Search of the Perfect Child: Genetic Testing and Selective
Abortion, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Oct. 30, 1996, at 1034, 1035. A couple's insurance
company threatened to withdraw coverage for their children if they did not abort their fe-
tus, whose prenatal testing divulged the gene-causing cystic fibrosis. See id. Cystic Fibro-
sis is a single-gene disorder caused by a mutation in a parent's gene and which is charac-
terized by chronic pulmonary disease, pancreatic insufficiency, and elevated levels of
sodium and chloride in sweat. See Jan L. Breslow et al., Distinguishing Homozygous and
Heterozygous Cystic Fibrosis Fibroblasts from Normal Cells by Differences in Sodium
Transport, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 1 (1981).
57. See Paul Nuki, Insurers Fight for Access to Results of Genetic Tests, SUNDAY
TIMES, Sept. 5, 1993, LEXIS, Nexis Library, curnews file (fearing that as genetic testing
becomes more accessible, insurance companies will conditionally "insist" that everyone
undergo testing before obtaining coverage). Mandating genetic testing as a prerequisite to
obtaining insurance would create risk groups into which the population would be placed: a
"genetic super-class" would be at one extreme with a "genetic sub-group" at the other. Id.
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mandatory genetic test to determine where the imperfections lie. 8 In-
surance premiums and coverage will then be based on the degree of any
flaw, leaving individuals at the mercy of their own genetic information. 9
B. Employment Discrimination
Advancing genetic technology has provided certain benefits to em-
ployees, which at the same time has increased the potential for employ-
ment discrimination.60 Although employers have both a right and re-
sponsibility to maintain a safe work environment, the development of
genetic testing raises issues about the scope of information to which em-
ployers are entitled, confidentiality, and third-party access to informa-
tion.61 Concerns about insurance coverage and increased premiums al-
58. See id.; see also Recommendations on Genetic Information and the Workplace:
Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of Human Genome Research, (visited Feb. 2, 1998)
http://www.napbc.org/napbc/recommen.htm> (discussing how the ability to identify ge-
netic disease raises concerns that the information will be used to discriminate against indi-
viduals). Accordingly, comprehensive legislation should be adopted to protect all sensi-
tive medical information. See id.; see also Arnst, supra note 54 (discussing the use of
genetic testing by employers to weed out job applicants); Bereano, supra note 49, at B5
(discussing the downside of the rapid pace of genetic testing, including increased employ-
ment and insurance discrimination). See generally Rothenberg, supra note 14, at 1 (noting
specific instances of genetic discrimination and stating that the public concern about the
exploitation of testing results is legitimate).
59. See Nuki, supra note 57 (discussing the potential use of genetic information to
classify people for insurance purposes).
60. See Lori B. Andrews & Ami S. Jaeger, Confidentiality of Genetic Information in
the Workplace, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 75, 75-76 (1991). Benefits such as the ability to avoid
jobs which may trigger the onset of a genetic illness and the knowledge of abnormal chro-
mosomes resulting from exposure to toxins such as asbestos are realized by employees
through genetic testing. See id. at 76. Many states have laws granting employees access to
records about exposure to toxins, and several mandate that the employer specifically no-
tify the employee if the exposure exceeds threshold levels. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:6A-40(c) (West Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-143(c) (1993); W.VA. CODE § 21-
3A-8(c)(3)(1996). Among those interested in the results of genetic testing in the work-
place include occupational health care providers, managers, other employees, unions, and
the government. See Andrews & Jaeger, supra, at 76; see also Poll Shows Dark Side of
Genetic Research, supra note 39, at A5.
61. See CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
(OTA), GENETIC MONITORING AND SCREENING IN THE WORKPLACE 3 (1990) (report-
ing that employers historically have been allowed to require medical testing to ensure a
safe work environment). Recent advances in genetic technology expand an employer's
ability to medically monitor employees. See id. at 55-136 (discussing various medical pro-
cedures now available to employers). A 1989 OTA study determined that out of 1500
United States companies surveyed, one in twenty conducted some form of genetic moni-
toring or screening within the prior nineteen years. See id. at 22-23.
Confidentiality issues in the workplace involve managing the interests of those at risk.
See Andrews & Jaeger, supra note 60, at 95-96. For instance, one question employers are
struggling with is whether or not employees potentially at risk for an adverse genetic con-
1119
Catholic University Law Review
ready interplay with employment decisions. For instance, if a prospec-
tive employee's genetic testing reveals a condition which may require ex-
tensive health care coverage, an employer may not hire that individual
for fear that insurance will no longer be affordable.62 Those individuals
suffering from HIV infection or full-blown AIDS have experienced this
conflict.6' Employers, citing the risk of increased health care premiums,
have been cautious about hiring or maintaining employees who suffer
from the HIV infection or AIDS.64
Although many states have attempted to legislate the health care issue,
many employers and health care programs are exempt from such statu-
tory measures.6' The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
preempts state regulation of many health care plans, thus, state legisla-
tion is less effective in preventing genetic discrimination.
C. Societal Discrimination
Analogous to African Americans who suffer from sickle cell anemia 67
and persons who suffer from HIV infection or AIDS, societal discrimina-
tion also has become a determinant for those seeking to regulate the use
of genetic information.6 All individuals potentially carry a genetic defect
dition have the right to know the results of another employee's genetic testing. See id. at
95.
62. See Rothenberg, supra note 14, at 1. States have passed legislation prohibiting
insurers from genetic discrimination; however, ERISA exempts self-funded employer
plans from these state laws. See id.; see also Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2) (1994). Therefore, many employees remain unpro-
tected and open to insurance discrimination based on their genetic composition. See
Rothenberg, supra note 14, at 1.
63. See Gerald M. Oppenheimer & Robert A. Padgug, AIDS: The Risk to Insurers,
the Threat to Equity, 16 HASTINGS CrR. REP. 18, 21 (1986). Since the inception of the
AIDS epidemic, employers have often attempted to fire employees with AIDS or to ex-
clude coverage of AIDS from their insurance policies. See id.
64. See id.
65. See Rothenberg, supra note 14, at 1 (discussing the affects of ERISA on state
regulation efforts).
66. See id.
67. See Kobrin, supra note 1, at 1287 n.29 (stating that one in every 500 black children
is born with sickle cell disease). Sickle cell anemia occurs when the hemoglobin forms an
"S" shape at the onset of reduced oxygen levels in the blood stream. See id. The cells do
not flow throughout the bloodstream like normal cells; therefore "sickling" occurs, even-
tually causing early death. See id. During the 1970s, there was a surge of screening legisla-
tion for sickle cell anemia which was poorly drafted and ineffective, leading to misuse of
the information and discrimination. See id. at 1292.
68. See Fletcher & Wertz, supra note 22, at 748-49 (hypothesizing that, considering
the discrimination evidenced against those suffering from HIV, AIDS, and various other
disorders, society will not trust geneticists to use this information responsibly). "The dan-
gers of isolation, loss of insurance, educational, and job opportunities for persons diag-
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of some form, so unlike other diseases that affect certain races or that are
theoretically preventable, genetic defects are beyond an individual's con-
trol.69 Therefore, genetic discrimination has the potential to affect the
entire population at one time or another.70
In the 1970s, legislative efforts to mandate screening for sickle cell
anemia71 failed because of scientifically inaccurate programs, lack of ge-• • 72
netic counseling, and lack of confidentiality provisions. As a result,
employment and insurance discrimination was rampant, as was abuse of
the private information. Societal discrimination, partially founded in
racial discrimination, also increased 4  These legislative inadequacies
cannot be forgotten when regulating the use of genetic information in
order to avoid repeating past mistakes.
Psychological stress related to family histories of genetic diseases or to
the decision of whether to undergo testing for such diseases is rapidly
surfacing.75 Simultaneously, the potential for familial conflict is also
growing as disputes as to whether immediate or extended family have the
nosed with incurable and costly disorders known from early childhood are real to many
who are concerned about potential clinical uses and abuses of the new genetics." Id. at
749.
69. See Nuki, supra note 57 (asserting that the entire population should be concerned
with the progress of genetic research).
70. See id.; see also Peters, supra note 56, at 1034 (stating that those who stand to
benefit from genetic testing will be the ones who suffer from the worst consequences, such
as increased insurance premiums. See Poll Shows Dark Side of Genetic Research, supra
note 39, at A5 (discussing research which indicates that those who suffer from genetic de-
fects are discriminated against on a variety of levels).
71. See PHILIP REILLY, GENETICS, LAW, AND SOCIAL POLICY 66 (1977) (noting that
Arizona, California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Lousiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mis-
sissippi, Kentucky, New York, Virginia, and the District of Columbia enacted sickle cell
screening legislation between 1970 and 1972).
72. See id. at 72-73.
73. See id. at 67. During the 1970s, airlines grounded black employees indiscrimi-
nately due to fears that a "sickling crisis" might occur if the plane depressurized. See id. at
74. In addition, insurance companies charged higher premiums without any reliance on
mortality rates. See Rothenberg, supra note 14, at 1.
74. See Reilly, supra note 71.
75. See Richard M. Glass, AAAS Conference Explores Ethical Aspects of Large Pedi-
gree Genetic Research, 267 JAMA 2158 (1992). Carrying a defective gene affects the indi-
vidual physically and psychologically. See id. at 2159. It affects one's perception of oneself
and one's relationship to family and the world. See id.; see also Rothenberg, supra note 14,
at 1 (recounting the story of a forty-year-old woman with a history of breast cancer who
underwent genetic testing only to lose her employer-based health insurance and her job
after testing positive for the BRAC1 gene). People are afraid because genetic testing will
not only reveal their predispositions to disease, but because it will also adversely affect the
future of their families. See id.
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right to know about potential genetic defects remain unresolved.76
II. NEW JERSEY'S GENETIC PRIVACY ACT
A. The Proposed Genetic Privacy Act: New Jersey's Expansive
Legislation
New Jersey's genetic legislation, although largely focused on health in-
surance and employment discrimination, addresses some of the greater
social ramifications of the increased use of genetic information by creat-
ing a privacy right in an individual's genetic information. This legisla-
tion has the potential to influence a national policy on genetic informa-
tion because of its breadth and because of the debate over whether this
information should be protected through a property or privacy right.
78
The Genetic Privacy Act was introduced to the New Jersey legislature
on February 15, 1996.79 The legislation was to provide a comprehensive
regulatory framework to protect against unwarranted genetic testing, ge-
netically based discrimination, and disclosure of genetic information
without consent.80 An express property right in genetic information was
established as the vehicle of protection and the use of genetic informa-
tion was left to the discretion of the individual."' The New Jersey Legis-
76. See Suter, supra note 1, at 1856 (arguing that mandatory disclosure of genetic
information should be banned and that mandatory third-party access to genetic informa-
tion is unconstitutional). Regarding familial conflicts, the person who has been tested may
want to "avoid harm" from disclosure and keep the results private while a relative may
want to know the results in order to prevent harm to herself or her family. See id. at 1855.
"When genetic testing of one person can benefit another family member, privacy and
autonomy interests of the former may collide with the relative's interests in protecting her
health or planning her future." Id.
77. See 1996 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 126; see also infra notes 79-82 (discussing the pur-
poses and various provisions of this proposed legislation).
78. See Reilly, supra note 43, Ji 2-4, 7-8 (discussing the scope of New Jersey's legis-
lation in comparison with legislation passed by other states); see also Lin, supra note 10, at
133-34 (concluding that a federal property right should be conferred in DNA); cf. Suter,
supra note 1, at 1907-08 (concluding that an individual's genetic information is protected
by his or her constitutional privacy and autonomy interests).
79. See Staff N.J. State Library, Legislative Checklist for N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12
(West 1996),
80. See Memorandum from Assemblywoman Rose Heck to Marvin Jiggetts (Oct. 26,
1995) [hereinafter Heck Memorandum] (noting that the New Jersey bill was based on
similar legislation enacted in California, Colorado, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Ohio,
Oregon, and Wisconsin).
81. See Senate Health Committee Statement to Senate Committee Substitute for
Senate, Nos. 695 and 854, 207th Legis. Reg. Sess. 1 (N.J. 1996) [hereinafter Senate Com-
mittee Substitute] (noting "an individual's genetic information is the property of that indi-
vidual and prohibits any person from retaining an individuals genetic information without
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lature passed the Genetic Privacy Act and sent it to Governor Whitman
in June of 1996.82
Unlike statutes passed in other states,83 the New Jersey Genetic Pri-
vacy Act is landmark legislation due to its comprehensive coverage of is-
sues raised by the progress of genetic research.4 Many state statutes,
such as those enacted in Oregon, California, and New York, provide ex-
tensive protection of genetic information but are limited in their scope to
insurance companies and employers.85 Although the potential for dis-
crimination permeates our society, these state legislatures did not protect
society from the use of genetic information, but instead narrowly focused
86
on issues of genetic testing in health care insurance and employment.
State legislatures, however, are not alone because legislation proposed in
first obtaining specific authorization from the individual ... except under certain limited
circumstances").
82. See id.; cf. Why We Need H.R. 306, supra note 11 (stating that the intent of the
proposed Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997 is to ensure access
to genetic information without the fear of discrimination on behalf of insurance compa-
nies).
83. See supra note 42 (citing genetic legislation which has been enacted in many
states, including New Jersey).
84. See Burnett, supra note 4, at 526 (noting the magnitude of New Jersey's Genetic
Privacy law); see also Reilly, supra note 43, at IT 3 (discussing the limited focus of genetic
legislation passed before the New Jersey law).
85. See CAL CIV CODE § 56.17 (West Supp. 1997); CAL HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE
§ 1374.7 (West 1990); CAL. INS. CODE § 10140(c) (West Supp. 1998); CAL INS CODE
§ 10123.3, (West 1993); N.Y. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1997-98) (prohibiting employ-
ers, labor organizations, and licensing agencies from requesting genetic tests or the disclo-
sure of test results from employees or on job applications); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.036
(1995) (establishing a property right in genetic information and limiting the circumstances
in which third parties may obtain an individual's genetic information); see also GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-54-1-6 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.64 (Anderson 1997); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 111.372 (West 1997).
Although the property right was omitted from New Jersey's legislation, interest groups
such as the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturer's Association (PhRMA) are still
concerned because the Oregon law creates a precedent for protecting genetic information
with a property right. See Whitman Signs Comprehensive Genetic Privacy and Anti-
Discrimination Bill, HEALTH LEGISLATION & REGULATION: WASHINGTON POLITICS,
POLICIES & REGULATION, Nov. 27, 1996, at 2 [hereinafter Whitman Signs Bill]. PhRMA
is concerned with the potential consequences this will have on scientific research. See id.
86. See Andrews, supra note 34, at 47. There is a substantial difference between car-
rying the gene for a genetic disease and actually developing the disease. See id. at 48.
Modern research has enabled scientists to more efficiently determine who carries the
genes for specific traits; however, the mere knowledge that a child possesses the trait for a
learning disability does not mean that the disability will manifest itself. See id. But its
consequences may be placing "normal" children into specialized learning in anticipation of
a disorder from which the child will never suffer. See id. The ramifications of this new-
found knowledge transcend science and medicine, but it does not appear as if the legisla-
tures or courts are prepared to realize this. See id. at 48-49.
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the United States House of Representatives also focused solely on issues
related to health care insurance and employment.8 7
The proposed New Jersey Legislation broadens the protection avail-
able to individuals with genetic abnormalities by amending the State's
antidiscrimination laws."' New Jersey's legislative purpose in regulating
genetic information was to protect individuals with genetic diseases and
those at risk of inheriting genetic diseases from general societal discrimi-
nation as well as from insurance and employment discrimination.89
B. Conflicting Perspectives on the Legal Classification of Genetic
Information: The Conditional Veto of the Genetic Privacy Act
New Jersey's proposed Genetic Privacy Act was never enacted into
law. 90 On September 19, 1996, Governor Christine Todd Whitman condi-
tionally vetoed the Act.9' Specifically, Governor Whitman redacted the
provision creating a property right in genetic information, replacing it
with a privacy right."
A property right in genetic information establishes the individual's
ownership of the material. Under American property law, an owner-
87. See Why We Need H.R. 306, supra note 11 (discussing the goals of the federally
proposed legislation).
88. See Senate Committee Substitute, supra note 81 (addressing the goals and effects
of the Genetic Privacy Act).
89. See id.; see also Heck Memorandum, supra note 80 (discussing the need for legis-
lation to protect the insurance interests of breast cancer patients).
90. See N.J. Governor Vetoes Genetic Privacy Act, LAW & POLICY REPORTER, Oct.
1996, at 160 [hereinafter Governor Vetoes].
91. See id.
92. See id.; see also Private Genes, supra note 18, at 26 (discussing the benefits of cre-
ating a privacy right in genetic information and denouncing the creation of a property
right as premature). Other changes proposed by the governor included:
(1) Amending the provision on duty to provide notice of genetic testing to man-
date any person who requires or requests the testing to provide notice to the in-
dividual tested, thus ensuring that only insurance companies and employers will,
not researchers or research laboratories, be burdened;
(2) permitting the state health commissioner to 'adopt federal guidelines when
promulgating rules on informed consent';
(3) applying the bill's unfair discrimination standard to credit life and credit ac-
cident as well as to life insurance, annuities, and disability income contracts to
eliminate disparate treatment of insurance companies.
Id.; see also Senate Committee Substitute, supra note 81 (stating that the purpose of the
bill is to define privacy rights to genetic information in order to prevent improper or dis-
criminatory use of the information and that the creation of a property right is not neces-
sary).
93. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (6th ed. 1990). "Property" is ownership of
a thing in relation to third-party rights. See id.
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ship interest is comprised of a "bundle of rights" which sets apart an in-
dividual's right to the material from anyone else's.94 Property law has
developed from the case law of the individual states.9 Therefore, al-
though classifying an object as "property" implies the owner has
autonomous control over the object, the legal definition recognizes re-
strictions on a person's actions with regard to their property.96
A privacy right, in comparison, attaches substantive due process rights
to the information which triggers heightened judicial scrutiny and re-
quires the state to proffer a compelling interest to obtain the informa-
tion.97 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the
right to privacy as a fundamental right that is essential to individual lib-
erty.98 Privacy rights thus hold a more constitutionally stable position
than do property rights.
The establishment of a property right in genetic information was re-
jected by Governor Whitman because of its potentially negative impact
on scientific research. 99 Governor Whitman opined that the goals of the
legislation, protecting privacy and preventing discrimination, did not re-
quire a property right protection.0 Governor Whitman's other concerns
focused on research; creating a property right, according to Governor
94. See First Charter Land Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 643 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (4th Cir. 1981)
(stating that property refers to the actual physical object and the various incorporeal own-
ership rights, such as the right to possess and the right to alienate); see also infra notes 136-
50 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on property rights).
95. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.5
(5th ed. 1995) (discussing the nature and development of property rights in the United
States).
96. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (6th ed. 1990).
97. See Barrad, supra note 3, at 1049 (explaining the legal nature of property rights in
American law and specifically discussing the alienability of property).
98. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 95, § 11.7 (analyzing the development and
classification of fundamental rights in constitutional law).
99. Compare Governor Vetoes, supra note 90, at 160 (establishing the bases upon
which Governor Whitman vetoed the initial version of the Genetic Privacy Act), with
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 494 (Cal. 1990) (holding that Moore's
conversion of bodily tissue claim on the basis that he abandoned his interest during the
surgery was disallowed, and to hold otherwise would significantly impede scientific re-
search).
100. See Senate Committee Substitute, supra note 81 (relaying Governor Whitman's
opinion to the state legislature that "[the] bill is designed to avoid [the] danger [of im-
proper harm to those with genetic defects] by clarifying privacy rights and prohibiting dis-
crimination based on information obtained through genetic testing"). Governor Whitman
continued to convey her concern that the original drafting of the bill would create further
problems with harmful consequences, such as the "establishment of a new property right is
a fundamental change from current practice that will have unintended but troubling con-
sequences for research." Id.
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Whitman, would drastically hinder research efforts by forcing scientists
to obtain permission to use genetic information and complicate research
by creating royalty issues for those whose genetic information led to sig-
nificant discoveries.'0 ' If an individual owns their genetic material in the
same manner as any other material possession, compensation would have
to be offered in exchange for its use.' ° Accordingly, research would halt
while these issues are resolved, thereby costing the scientific community
valuable time and money.103
As a result of these concerns, the bill was sent back to the New Jersey
Senate for reconsideration.0 4 The final version of the bill, less any men-
tion of property rights, was signed into law by Governor Whitman in No-
vember 1996.105
The current Genetic Privacy Act states that an individual's genetic in-
formation contains "uniquely" private information about the individual
and offers protection against unwarranted disclosure of such informa-
tion.106 Therefore, deleting the property protection did not deter the in-
tent of the bill to protect against improper uses of genetic information. 7
101. See id. Governor Whitman was also concerned about lawsuits that may arise
from the royalties issue, and therefore felt that the simplest way to achieve the stated goals
was to create a privacy right. See id.
102. See id.
103. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 494 (holding that a possessory interest in genetic informa-
tion would hinder scientific research).
104. See Office of the Governor News Release, Nov. 19, 1996 [hereinafter News Re-
lease] (discussing the Governor's veto of the original bill due to the creation of a property
right in genetic information); see also Whitman Signs Bill, supra note 85, at 2 (noting that
although the property right was deleted when Governor Whitman signed the Genetic Pri-
vacy Act, there is still concern over other states' genetic protection laws which have estab-
lished property rights in genetic information).
105. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12 (West 1985); see also News Release, supra note
104 (announcing Governor Whitman's signing of the Genetic Privacy Act); Whitman Signs
Bill, supra note 85, at 2 (discussing the deletion of the property right in the final language
of the bill and claiming that those who supported the bill were not opposed to the deletion
of this right).
106. See Assembly Health Committee Amendments to Assembly Committee Substi-
tute for Assembly, Nos. 1499 and 1411 (replacing section two of the proposed Genetic Pri-
vacy Act with language that requires an individual's consent to the dissemination of their
genetic information).
107. See id. (replacing the bill's section 2 with the governor's suggestions while main-
taining the original intent of the legislation). Section 2(c) states "[tihe improper collec-
tion, retention or disclosure of genetic ... test results can lead to significant
harm ... including stigmatization and discrimination" Id. It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that the new amendments to this bill replace the phrase "genetic information" with
"genetic test results," thereby limiting the scope of protection. See id. Genetic informa-
tion refers to the information located within the nucleus of each cell in the human body
whereas genetic testing refers to techniques capable of determining the presence of spe-
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While the method of protection has been revised, the unique characteris-
tics of the legislation, mainly its comprehensiveness, remain intact. 18
C. New Jersey Law Regarding Privacy Rights and Medical Information
Before the Passage of the Genetic Privacy Act
Prior to the enactment of the Genetic Privacy Act, New Jersey law
failed to provide adequate protection against the abuse of medical in-
formation. °9 The draft Act set a precedent because medical information
never had been protected as a personal property right before."0 For in-
stance, New Jersey insurance practice law defines personal information
without any mention of property rights."' The regulation of insurance
information does not address the individual's relationship with their in-
surance information."' Rather, it focuses on how the insurance company
may utilize an individual's information. This statute fails to provide a
satisfactory level of protection for individuals because there are other
statutes under which insurance companies can easily obtain and commu-
nicate information from or to a third party."
13
1. Doctor-Patient Confidentiality
Another method of protection under New Jersey common law, which
was codified in 1968, is the privileged and confidential relationship be-
cific genetic defects. See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 6, at 4.
108. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (describing the Genetic Privacy Act
in further detail).
109. See Senate Committee Substitute, supra note 81 (discussing the inadequacy of
existing laws related to genetic information). Prior to the Genetic Privacy Act, there were
no express provisions for the protection of genetic information and statutory law cohe-
sively codified in the New Jersey code. See id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:23A-1 (West
1994) (covering insurance information practices); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.1 (West
1994) (defining the patient-physician privilege); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-2 (West 1989)
(addressing the right to inspect public documents); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12 (West
1985) (prohibiting discrimination in the insurance industry).
110. See Senate Committee Substitute, supra note 81 (stating that the property right
established by the original version of the Genetic Privacy Act was a "fundamental change
from current practice").
111. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:23A-2(t) (West 1994) (defining personal information as
"any individually identifiable information gathered in connection with an insurance trans-
action from which judgments can be made about an individual's character, habits, avoca-
tions," etc); cf. Whitman Signs Bill, supra note 85, at 2 (defining a property right in genetic
information as ownership of the material and the research resulting from it).
112. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:23A-1 (West 1994).
113. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:23A-13 (West 1994) (describing the limitations and condi-
tions related to the disclosure of information and providing for the means by which an in-
surance company can gain access to an individual's genetic information).
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tween a doctor and a patient.114 The doctor is protected from having to
reveal any information related to his or her patients, including informa-
tion obtained from physical exams and confidential communications."5
The New Jersey Superior Court confronted the issue of doctor-patient
confidentiality when deciding whether a doctor has a duty to warn family
members of a potentially genetically transmitted illness in Safer v. The
Estate of Pack."6 In Safer, Dr. Pack and the plaintiff's father had a doc-
tor-patient relationship. "7 Dr. Pack unsuccessfully treated the plaintiff's
father for colon cancer and multiple polyposis of the colon."' When the
plaintiff was thirty-six years old, she underwent surgery to resolve a can-
cerous blockage and multiple polyposis of the colon." 9 The daughter
brought suit against Dr. Pack, contending that her condition was heredi-
tary and alleging that Dr. Pack was negligent in not informing the family
of the risk of contracting the condition.'20 The New Jersey Superior
Court held that the standard of care owed by a physician to his patient
creates a duty to warn third parties only when these third parties are
identifiable, such as siblings and children. 2' The court limited its holding
by stating that this duty is satisfied by warning the patient, who can in-
form those who are at risk.'
22
Although Safer v. The Estate of Pack has not been overruled, the pas-
sage of the Genetic Privacy Act affected or altered its holding.' 3 A doc-
tor's obligation to inform a patient of any disease he or she may carry
remains intact.'24 A doctor's duty to warn third parties, however, either
has been overruled, or at least modified.
114. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.1 (West 1994).
115. See id.
116. 291 NJ. Super. 619 (1996).
117. See id. at 622-23.
118. See id. at 621-22.
119. See id. at 622.
120. See id. at 623. Plaintiff also asserted that the hereditary nature of the condition
was known at the time the plaintiff's father was treated by Dr. Pack. See id.
121. See id. at 625-26.
122. See id.
123. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12(2)(b) (West 1996) (stating that genetic informa-
tion is personal and prohibiting collection or disclosure of such information without the
express consent of the individual). Therefore, Dr. Pack would no longer be permitted to
inform the plaintiff or any other family members of Mr. Safer's genetic disease without the
consent of the original patient.
124. See id. This statute does not prevent a doctor from informing the patient of any
defect. See id. It only prevents the doctor from informing anyone outside of that relation-
ship about the patient's condition. See id.
125. See id. Due to the enactment of this statute, it is hard to imagine that a doctor
would be permitted to bypass a patient's consent to inform the family of that patient's
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2. The Common Law Right-to-Know Doctrine
Under New Jersey common law, the public has the right to inspect any
public documents. 6 In Home News v. New Jersey Department of
Health,'127 a New Jersey statute limiting public access to public records
was challenged by a newspaper seeking to determine the cause of death
of a missing five-year-old boy. By codifying this right, the New Jersey
legislature conflicted with the state's statute protecting the privacy inter-
. • . '29
ests of those individuals afflicted with certain diseases.
The statute limiting public access to death certificates was intended to
effectuate the confidentiality provisions of the Cancer Registry Act, the
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Assistance Act, and the Regis-
tration of Vital Statistics Act.3° Limiting cause of death information, ac-
cording to the Home News Court, was the final step in protecting the pri-
vacy of those who die from diseases which carry a social stigma, such as
AIDS or cancer."'
The right-to-know law, in contrast, grants citizens an "absolute right"
to access public records, including death certificates.' Therefore, the
court was forced to determine whether individual privacy concerns out-
weighed the right to information.' The court held that despite the valid
condition, regardless of any genetic factors. See id.
126. See Southern N.J. Newspapers, Inc. v. Mt. Laurel, 660 A.2d 1173, 1181 (N.J. 1995)
(discussing the legal principals governing the public's common law right of access to public
records).
127. 677 A.2d 195 (N.J. 1996).
128. See id. at 197.
129. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE. § 8:2A-1.2(a)(2)(1996) (requiring that information con-
cerning the cause of death be omitted from death certificates unless the applicant is a close
relative or the decedent's executor).
130. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2-107 (West 1996) (requiring confidentiality under the
Cancer Registry Act); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:5C-7 to 13 (West 1996) (maintaining confi-
dentiality under the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Assistance Act); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 28:8-40.22 to 40.23 (West 1996) (providing confidentiality under the Registration
of Vital Statistics Act); see also Home News v. New Jersey Dep't of Health, 667 A.2d 196,
196-97 (N.J. 1996) (stating that each of these regulations require that cases of cancer,
AIDS, and birth defects be reported to the Department of Health and that each regulation
provides that personal information will be kept confidential).
131. See Home News, 677 A.2d. at 197.
132. See id. at 198. The codified right to inspect public documents is not as broad as
the common law rule. See id. Although death certificates irrefutably fall within the cate-
gory of public records, access under the right to know statute is restricted to those who
have an interest in the subject matter of the material sought. See id. But see N.J. ADMIN.
CODE § 8:2A-1.2(a)(2) (1996) (restricting access to death certificate information to those
who are immediate family, executors, or those who have the consent of the immediate
family).
133. See Home News, 677 A.2d at 199-200.
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privacy concerns expressed through the confidentiality statute, the news-
paper's interest in receiving information outweighed the need to main-
tain confidentiality as a matter of individual privacy.
1 4
D. The Constitutional Significance of Property and Privacy
Classifications
The United States Constitution provides that: "[n]o state
shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law. 135 Beyond that, however, property and privacy rights are
not defined within the United States Constitution.'36 The law is particu-
larly unclear when dealing with property rights, since the Supreme Court
has never classified them as "fundamental.'
3 7
1. Property
The status of property rights has fluctuated since this country was
founded. The framers of the Constitution strongly believed in broad
property rights; for instance, James Madison described property rights as
134. See id. In reaching this holding, the court balanced the public need for access to
information against the need for confidentiality and concluded that since the death in
question was likely a homicide, the need for the information was greater than the need for
confidentiality. See id. at 200.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
136. See Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO L.J. 555, 625
(1997) (concluding that the Supreme Court must "reestablish symmetry between property
and liberty in its substantive due process jurisprudence"). According to Krotoszynski, the
failure to establish a fundamental property right is illogical. See id. at 624; see also Harry
Kalven Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 326, 327 (1966) (discussing the nonexistence of a privacy right at early
common law).
137. See Krotoszynski, supra note 136, at 555-57 (noting that although there are many
property rights, the Supreme Court has refused to grant them more than minimal protec-
tion). Substantive Due Process protects personal interests that are created by the Consti-
tution. See Craig Hillwig, Comment, Giving Property All the Process That's Due: A "Fun-
damental" Misunderstanding About Due Process, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 710 (1992). A
right is deemed fundamental under the incorporation doctrine when the right is "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 711. Courts have granted "fundamental" status
to rights of privacy, interstate travel, and voting. See id. at 712. When a state infringes on
these fundamental rights, the court uses strict judicial scrutiny to determine the constitu-
tionality of the state action. See id.
Griswold v. Connecticut is heralded for reviving substantive due process as a method for
protecting integral rights not mentioned in the Constitution. See Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that there is a fundamental right to privacy in reproduc-
tive decisions); see also Krotoszynski, supra note 136, at 557 (arguing that property rights
should not be treated differently under substantive due process jurisprudence). Because
both property and liberty interests are in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments, they should be treated similarly by the courts. See id.
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defining the human identity, in that they distinguish people from one an-
other. 13 This principal has been narrowed over time. 39 Although access
to genetic information was not an issue confronted by the framers of the
Constitution, early American property rights did include the right to
one's physical characteristics, which are determined by genetic informa-
tion.
An often-ignored United States Supreme Court opinion delivered in
1921 addresses the fundamental nature of property rights."' In Truax v.
141Corrigan, unionized cooks and wait staff of the Truax Restaurant went
on strike to contest unfair wages. 14' The strikers picketed in an attempt
to affect patronage of the restaurant, causing a substantial loss in busi-
ness to Truax.'4 Truax unsuccessfully attempted to enjoin the picketers
due to Arizona's statute prohibiting the courts from taking such action.45
Truax raised a property claim before the United States Supreme Court,
alleging that his business was a property which the State had failed to
protect.146 The Court held that a business is a property right and that a
state is obligated to recognize and protect certain fundamental property
interests from restriction. 47 Arizona could not enforce a law which de-
prived a citizen of property rights without due process of law.'" The Su-
preme Court has yet to revisit this issue, thereby leaving property rights
relatively open ended.
According to American property law, property ownership is a bundle
138. See Barrad, supra note 3, at 1053-54 (quoting J. Madison, PROPERTY (1792), in 6
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 101 (G. Hunt ed., 1906) (asserting that individuals have
property interests in their identity, comprised of characteristics and traits differentiating
one human being from another)).
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See Krotoszynski, supra note 136, at 558 (stating that the Supreme Court has not
recently "spoken" to whether property rights are fundamental).
142. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
143. See id. at 321.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 322. The statute created an exception to the general rule against inhib-
iting property rights by allowing courts to issue an injunction when necessary to prevent
irreparable injury to the property or property right of another. See id.
146. See id. Truax also alleged that the statute denied him equal protection of the law
by withholding injunctive relief available to citizens in non-labor situations. See id.
147. See id. at 328; see also Krotoszynski, supra note 136, at 558-59 (claiming that al-
though the Truax Court was cited favorably during the past seventy years, its holding
never has been addressed by the courts and that Truax was the "high-water mark" for sub-
stantive due process protection of property rights).
148. See Truax, 257 U.S. at 328.
149. See Krotoszynski, supra note 136, at 624-25.
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of rights."" Property ownership, however, is not an absolute concept. It
can be controlled by both state and federal regulations, as well as by the
possessory interests of the individual. 1 ' A property interest can arise and




In contrast to property rights, privacy rights are clearly recognized as
"fundamental" by the Supreme Court.'53 In Griswold v. Connecticut,
5 4
the Supreme Court launched a revival of modern substantive due process
jurisprudence and created a privacy right not enumerated in the Consti-
tution.55 In Griswold, a challenge was brought against a state statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples. 56 The Court
held that individuals have a fundamental liberty interest in the decision
of whether or not to have a child, with which the state cannot interfere
without a compelling reason or interest 5
Since Griswold, the Court consistently has held that reproductive deci-
sions involve fundamental privacy rights, thus requiring the State to
prove that a law is necessary to promote a compelling state interest in
order to divest an individual of the right to make such decisions."" The
Court recently modified this dictum with regard to abortion rights when
it adopted the "undue burden" on the woman test to determine an in-
fringement of the right to abortion. Today, the right to privacy encom-
passes much of what originally was conceived of as a right to property,
and is thought of as the broadest individual protection not enumerated in
150. See Barrad, supra note 3, at 1049 (stating that property interests include exclusive
possession, control over use of the property, alienability, devisability, and length of owner-
ship). For a more detailed discussion of ownership concepts in American property law,
see ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, THE LAW OF PROPERTY (1984).
151. See Barrad, supra note 3, at 1049.
152. See id. Since property is alienable, new property interests are created through
gifts and donations as well. See id.
153. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (creating a privacy right in
the decision to beget a child).
154. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
155. See id. at 485.
156. See id. at 480.
157. See id. at 485.
158. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
159. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869-75 (1992) (rejecting the tri-
mester framework of Roe v. Wade and adopting a test which disallows the State to impose
an "undue burden" on the woman's right to make an abortion decision).
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the Constitution.
III. PROPERTY VERSUS PRIVACY: PROTECTING THE USE OF GENETIC
INFORMATION
A. The Nature of Property Rights in American Jurisprudence and Their
Relationship to Scientific Research and Genetic Information
Although the recognition of a property right in genetic information is
not a complete solution, it is worthy of consideration. American juris-
prudence always has treated property rights somewhat precariously, and
although many believe a property right would not adequately protect ge-
netic information, there are strong arguments to the contrary. 6 ' The lack
of express treatment of property rights has created an opportunity for
clarification and definition."' Indeed, the re-birth of substantive due
process has hindered this development by transforming many former
property rights into privacy rights and by focusing on fundamental lib-
erty.163
Genetic information can reasonably be classified as property from a
legal standpoint.'6 For example, the Genetic Privacy Act, introduced to
Congress in 1995, confers a property interest in an individual's DNA
molecules. The enactment of such a law would have established a clear
160. See Krotoszynski, supra note 136, at 555 (discussing the historic perspective of
what a right to property should encompass).
161. See id. at 588-89 (discussing the Framers' view that property rights encompass a
broad range of human rights); see also Barrad, supra note 3, at 1048-53 (analyzing whether
genetic information is characteristic of property and concluding that it may be because not
all property characteristics need be present in an object to deem it a property interest).
162. See E. RICHARD GOLD, BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 2-3 (1996) (defining "property" as
rights given to individuals which allow them to make value judgments in relation to spe-
cific objects); see also Barrad, supra note 3 at 1049 (defining "property" as a state-
protected collection of interests that a person may have incident to ownership).
163. See Krotoszynski, supra note 136, at 605-07 (discussing the revival of the substan-
tive due process doctrine and its emphasis on fundamental liberties and privacy rights).
164. See Barrad, supra note 3, at 1086 (concluding that the courts should recognize a
property interest in genetic information); see also Lin, supra note 10, at 134 (suggesting
that Congress adopt the original version of the Genetic Privacy Act, thus creating a prop-
erty right in genetic information). The Genetic Privacy Act discussed by Lin was drafted
by George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H., Leonard Glantz, J.D., and Patricia Roche, J.D., and the
manuscript is available from the Health Law Department of the Boston University School
of Public Health. See id. at 111 n.17. This Act was introduced to Congress in 1995, where
it was subsequently referred to committee, but not enacted into law. See id.
165. See Lin, supra note 10, at 111. This proposal is a first step toward the protection
of genetic information. See id. However, the act fails to address the existence of property
rights in the genetic materials themselves and the apportionment of benefits from research
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national standard, protecting individual and societal interests. It would
have furthered scientific research in genetics. 67 Another alternative with
the potential for clearly defining a national policy, or at least serving as a
model for one, is New Jersey's version of the Genetic Privacy Act.'
1. The Nature of Scientific Research and the Implications of
Establishing a Property Right in Genetic Information
Reservations about the creation of a property right in genetic informa-
tion are rooted in the nature of scientific research. 6  Human tissue al-
ways has had a monetary value in Europe,1 70 but not in the United States
until organ transplants flourished in the 1940s.17' The National Organ
Transplant Act (NOTA) banned the sale of human organs.7 7 NOTA was
enacted to maintain an equitable system of distribution of organs for
transplants and to eliminate the "trade" of organs.'73 Despite the enact-
ment of NOTA, the human body has since become recognized as a
"good" worth some value on many different levels.1 4  Therefore, pro-
and development using such materials. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 128-29 (claiming that the adoption of the Genetic Privacy Act would
encourage dissemination of information, protect and facilitate scientific research, and sup-
port the donation of raw materials for scientific research).
168. See Reilly, supra note 43, 2-4.
169. See Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479, 487-88 (Cal.
1990) (finding that allowing conversion for scientific use of bodily tissue would have tre-
mendous ramifications for scientific research); cf Senate Committee Substitute, supra
note 81 (describing the governor's reasons for vetoing the property right created by the
original version of New Jersey's Genetic Privacy Act).
170. See RUSSELL SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 1-3 (1981) (noting that the intrin-
sic value of the human body was recognized in Europe decades earlier than in the United
States).
171. See id. at 3 (describing the modern transplantation era in the United States).
172. National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274 (1994) (making it
illegal for anyone to buy or sell human organs for transplantation).
173. See Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, (OTA),
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND
CELLS 31, 31-46 (1987) (discussing policy issues and options for congressional action re-
garding the uses of human tissue and cells).
174. See GOLD, supra note 162, at 12 (discussing the various reasons for valuing the
human body: for its diversity, for individual personalities, and for the ability to recognize
others as different from ourselves). In modern times, body products such as blood and
semen are readily available for sale. See SCOTT, supra note 170, at 190-91. Historically,
property rights in the human body have been recognized through the practice of slavery
and through the former notion that a wife was the property of her husband. See Stephen
A. Mortinger, Comment, Spleen for Sale: Moore v. Regents of the University of California
and the Right to Sell Parts of Your Body, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 499, 503 (1990).
State statutes and the common law also have limited the property interests that people
have in their bodies. See id. at 505. For example, in Schmerber v. California, the Supreme
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tecting the human body and the information contained therein revolves
around societal expectations and morality, as much as it does around
legislation and case law.
Genetic research, a growing element of modem scientific study, relies
on a steady supply of raw biological material. Included in this materialS 177
are cells, tissues, and organs derived from living human donors.
Among those affected by genetic research and the need for raw material
are donors, researchers, and the public.' Therefore, legislating to pro-
tect genetic information keeps or maintains such interests in mind. 1
79
Creating a property right in genetic information may hinder the mainte-
nance of a steady flow of available raw material because a new focus will
be placed on actual possession of the information.' 0 This new focus will
not only morally affect the nature of scientific research, but it will also
complicate the functions of the patent and royalty system.181
2. Property Rights in Genetic Information and the Potential Effects
on Genetic Discrimination
Classifying genetic information as a property right also requires an ex-
amination of its effect on genetic discrimination. Recognition of genetic
information as a property right would protect individuals from intrusions
into their genetic information and prevent public abuse of the informa-
tion.82 Pursuant to statutes such as New Jersey's confidentiality statute,
Court held that the State may legally remove a person's blood for blood-alcohol testing
without consent. See id.; see also Schemerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966).
175. See GOLD, supra note 162, at 5 (stating that "through the allocation of rights of
control, society implicitly sanctions certain modes of valuing the human body and its mate-
rials, and discourages others"). For example, policy and legislation against selling organs
and body parts is largely derived from societal sanctioning of the concept. See id.
176. See Lin, supra note 10, at 109-10 (discussing the plethora of economic, social, and
ethical issues arising from the ever increasing need for raw biological materials).
177. See id.
178. See id. (analyzing the various conflicting interests affected by the need for raw
materials). For instance, the donors are largely concerned with the resolution of their par-
ticular ailment, whereas the researchers and those who support them are typically focused
on the "fruits" of their research and the advancement of science. See id. The public is
generally concerned with the knowledge and improved health care resulting from the raw
material donations and scientific research. See id.
179. See id.
180. See Barrad, supra note 3, at 1074 n.239 (claiming that critics of creating a property
right in genetic information raise arguments about improper motives for donating materi-
als and the potential negative impact on the poor, who may feel pressure to participate in
scientific experiments unwillingly).
181. See Lin, supra note 10, at 121-22 (discussing the implications of a royalty system
for genetic information).
182. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (describing four
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a property right would also limit public access to information about
causes of death.183 Statutes such as the one implicated in Home News
serve to protect the confidentiality of victims of AIDS and cancer; an ex-
press property right would strengthen the confidentiality of genetic in-
formation"' Additionally, this classification would create a proprietary
interest in one's identity, which is essentially one's DNA."'
Relinquishing control of genetic information to the individual would
halt concerns about insurance companies setting higher premiums based
on mandatory genetic testing results and employers terminating employ-
ees due to fear of increased health care costs.1 6 A property right alone,
however, is not a complete solution because issues dealing with scientific
research are left unattended.187 If the progress of research is halted, sci-
entists will never realize their capacity to understand the human body.
3. The Shortcomings of Establishing a Property Right in Genetic
Information
Governor Whitman believed that an express property right in genetic
information would stagnate scientific research, therefore she requested
its deletion from the bill.1 8 Governor Whitman supplanted a privacy
right.8 9 Unfortunately, due to the lack of federal legislation and judicial
case law there is no easy solution to this issue, ' ° and the creation of a pri-
vacy right does not automatically quell the rising concerns related to the
use of genetic information. A privacy right, as discussed below, provides
protection to the individual, but does not resolve the concerns about in-
surance, employment, or societal genetic discrimination.'9'
torts that are based on public invasion of a privacy right).
183. See Home News v. New Jersey Dep't of Health, 677 A.2d 195, 198 (N.J. 1996)
(discussing the rationale behind the confidentiality statutes and analyzing the court's
holding justifying the public's need for access to cause of death information).
184. See id.
185. See Barrad, supra note 3, at 1070 (claiming that the "[c]haracteristics of identity,
such as one's voice or face, are protected elements of personality because they are distinc-
tive, personal, and a palpable manifestation of identity").
186. See supra notes 50-85 and accompanying text (detailing the concerns about dis-
crimination that surround the use of genetic information).
187. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (linking increased research efforts
to genetic discrimination).
188. See Governor Vetoes, supra note 90,. at 160 (discussing Governor Whitman's con-
cerns about the property right included in the original draft as the reason for her veto).
189. See id.
190. See Why We Need H.R. 306, supra note 11 (noting the lack of adequate statutes
or case law to deal with the confidentiality issues raised by genetic research).
191. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (suggesting that property rights are
more stable because of their constitutional position, but that they do not adequately pro-
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B. Privacy Rights: Their Relationship to Scientific Research and Genetic
Information
The fundamental right to privacy, well founded in American jurispru-
dence, may be a more stable approach to regulating the use of genetic in-
formation.9' As with the creation of a property right, however, privacy
protection does not completely resolve the issues surrounding the scien-
tific use of genetic information. 93
1. The Fundamental Status of Privacy Rights Under Supreme Court
Jurispurdence
American courts have provided more substantial case law regarding
the status and treatment of privacy rights than property rights. In
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 94 the Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies both to substan-
tive and procedural law, and that fundamental rights within the term
"liberty" are constitutionally protected from state interference.9 5  Al-
though not precisely defined, fundamental rights include personal deci-
sions related to rearing children, procreation, and marriage."96
2. The Inherent Connection Between Privacy Rights and Genetic
Information
Privacy rights are strongly implicated in protecting the use of genetic
information. Genetic data determines identity, from physical appear-
ance to the ability to have healthy children, thereby linking it automati-
cally to the concept of "personhood."' 9' Mandatory genetic testing and
tect genetic information).
192. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text (discussing why Governor Whit-
man opted for the express privacy right in genetic information).
193. See infra notes 197-208 and accompanying text (discussing the potential complica-
tions an express privacy right in genetic information can create).
194. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
195. See id. at 846-47.
196. Compare Suter, supra note 1, at 1892 (quoting the Planned Parenthood v. Casey
statement that "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of exis-
tence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life"), with Barrad, supra
note 3, at 1053-54 (defining "property" as an individual's interest in identity and charac-
ter).
197. See Suter, supra note 1, at 1892-93.
198. See Glass, supra note 75, at 2158 (suggesting that knowledge of carrying a disease
gene affects an individual's perception of and relationships with the world); see also
Marlene Huggins et al., Predictive Testing for Huntington Disease in Canada: Adverse Ef-
fects and Unexpected Results in Those Receiving a Decreased Risk, 42 AM. J. MED.
GENETICs 508, 514-15 (1992) (discussing psychological difficulties experienced by indi-
viduals receiving decreased risk reports in cases in which other family members were less
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various intrusive methods of obtaining genetic information violate indi-
viduals rights to control their own destiny.' 99 Testing reveals an individ-
ual's genetic disposition but it should not, and does not, dictate the way
in which the individual or third party uses the information. °
The decision to undergo genetic testing involves weighing many fac-
tors' °1 that could affect not only the individual, but that individual's entire
family.2°2 This should be a personal decision, free from encroaching leg-
islation and unwanted influence from third parties.' °3 These decisions are
often spurred by the results of prenatal testing after the parents learn
that the fetus has a genetic deficiency. Ironically, it was the debate
over the right to bear a child that initiated the revitalization of the sub-
stantive due process doctrine. °5
3. Addressing Concerns about Insurance, Employment, and Societal
Genetic Discrimination Through Privacy Rights
A privacy right also addresses concerns about insurance, employment,
and societal discrimination. 2°6 If access to an individual's genetic infor-
mation is restricted, then logic dictates that the potential for abuse will be
alleviated. 207 This solution may not satisfy health insurance companies,
fortunate).
199. See Suter, supra note 1, at 1893 (arguing that the strong correlation between ge-
netic information and reproductive decisions supports the conclusion that no one should
decide which choice is better for another). The fact that genetic information is so personal
justifies its incorporation into the "fundamental privacy right[s]" classification. Id. at 1894.
Although persons may not have much control over their genetic sequence, they should
retain autonomy over decisions affected by this information. See id.
200. See id.
201. See supra note 75 (discussing the implications of genetic information and testing).
202. See Suter, supra note 1, at 1893 n.251.
203. See id. at 1894.
204. See Andrews, supra note 34, at 46-47 (describing new factors in a family's decision
to abort a child, including threats from insurance companies not to pay for the fetus's
care); see also Marta Russell, Genetic Screening: "Who Judges What Life is Worth?", L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1993, at Bl (stating that ethical quandaries arise when asymptomatic in-
dividuals are found to carry genes for latent genetic defects, such as Huntington's Disease,
which manifests in middle age). Carriers of these recessive genes likely make family plan-
ning decisions based on this information. See id. These ethical problems also arise with
prenatal testing when parents chose to carry a child with a genetic defect to term. See id.
Recent discoveries indicate that some latent genetic defects, such as those that cause mus-
cular dystrophy and spinal muscular atrophy, become increasingly worse from generation
to generation due to genetic mutations. See Anastasia Toufexis, The Generational Saga of
the Vicious Gene, TIME, Feb. 17,1992, at 72.
205. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82, 485 (1965).
206. See supra notes 49-76 and accompanying text (detailing the concerns surrounding
the use of genetic information and the potential for abuses).
207. See supra notes 49-76 and accompanying text.
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which argue that this information is critical in providing reasonably
priced health care for all.2°9 It may be necessary, however, in order to
preserve individual freedoms.
4. The Shortcomings of a Privacy Right in Genetic Information
Legislation regulating the use of genetic information based on funda-
mental privacy rights may have a stronger constitutional position than
legislation based on property rights. But this does not necessarily mean
that the potential abuses or conflicts stemming from the use of genetic
information are resolved.' 9 For example, the progress of the Human
Genome Project will halt unless the information learned may be dissemi-
nated."' Conflicts within families will increase over whether family
members, who may be impacted by the presence of a disease gene, have
the right to know that a genetic disease runs in the family.21' Therefore,
access to genetic information and scientific research can be hindered by
the creation of a broad property right in genetic information in much the
same way as if it were a property right. Similarly, privacy rights in ge-
netic information can adversely affect scientific research and family rela-
tions in the same way as a property right.2
208. See Nuki, supra note 57 (discussing further the position of health care insurers as
it relates to the use of genetic information).
209. See Lin, supra note 10, at 110 (discussing the public interest in information relat-
ing to the results of genetic research); see also Suter, supra note 1, at 1907-08 (addressing
the issue of familial conflicts arising over access to genetic information).
210. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text (discussing the Human Genome
Project).
211. See Suter, supra note 1, at 1855; see also Safer v. The Estate of Pack, 291 N.J. Su-
per. 619, 625 (1996) (holding that a doctor has an obligation to inform the patient that an
illness is hereditary).
212. See supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text (discussing the negative implica-
tions of recognizing a right to privacy in genetic information).
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C. Removing the Property Right from the New Jersey Genetic Privacy
Act: Is the Creation of a Broad Privacy Right in Genetic Information the
Appropriate Response?
Governor Whitman may be correct in asserting that controlling the use
of genetic information interferes with scientific research."' This may be a
function of the various interest groups affected by control of this infor-
mation and not of whether genetic information is classified as a property
or privacy right.1 The creation of a property or privacy right in this in-
formation may not be the central issue in promulgation legislation-per-
haps balancing these interests is the issue that should be addressed, al-
though it remains to be seen whether the strength of the New Jersey
statute will be affected by the deletion of the property right in genetic in-
formation."
Creating a privacy right in genetic information does not eliminate the
potentially negative impact on scientific research. It does, however, pro-
vide constitutionally recognized protection for the information that ex-
tends beyond what a property right could provide. 6 Property rights are
not clearly defined in modem day jurisprudence, but this ambiguity can
be advantageous because this leaves room for judicial maneuvering.27
Governor Whitman's concerns may be well founded, although not solely
attributable to the nature of property rights, indicating that a more pre-
cise legislative definition is required.
IV. A LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK TO REGULATE THE USE OF GENETIC
INFORMATION: CREATING A HAPPY MEDIUM
With the rate of scientific research increasing, a legislative solution to
regulating the use of genetic information is the best alternative.21 Coin-
213. See Governor Vetoes, supra note 90; see also Moore v. Regents of the University
of California, 793 P.2d 479, 494-95 (Cal. 1990) (discussing the impact of recognizing legal
ownership rights in genetic information).
214. See Lin, supra note 10, at 110 (discussing the various interest groups affected by
the use of genetic information).
215. See McKusiCK, supra note 18 (establishing or providing the intention of Human
Genome Project researchers to map the human genome by the year 2005). In the next ten
to twenty years, this issue will be moot because the human genome will be sequenced and
scientists will begin to discover cures to genetic diseases. See supra notes 18-24 and ac-
companying text (discussing the goals and progress of the Human Genome Project).
216. See supra notes 159-61 (describing the constitutional protection afforded genetic
information).
217. See supra notes 161-62 (discussing the opportunity presented to a legislature at-
tempting to define property rights).
218. See Barrad, supra note 3, at 1084 (claiming that courts may prefer to have a leg-
islative solution to this problem; however, the judiciary is better equipped for assessing the
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prehensive national legislation protecting the use of genetic information,
is the easiest way to stop the growth of genetic discrimination in most of
its forms.21 9
A. A Judicial or Legislative Solution: The Debate
A judicial solution, resolving issues such as insurance and employment
discrimination on a case-by-case basis, could never parallel the rate of
scientific research.220 Allowing the common law to address conflicts
arising out of the regulation of genetic information would be a tremen-
dous struggle. 22' The lag time of civil law suits alone poses problems, but
when the individual defendant is positioned against the enriched inter-
ests of the biotechnological field, the outcome may not always be reason-
able or fair. 2  The legislature can address the most major issues, leaving
the courts to refine the subtleties of these issues through case law.2 3
In disagreeing with this approach, some scholars believe that the courts
are adequately equipped to synthesize genetic information.24 Founded
on the notion that genetic information is a property right and that defin-
ing property rights has traditionally always been the responsibility of
appropriate means for protecting this information). This argument is based on the notion
that genetic information is a property right and that property rights have historically been
protected by state case law. See id. However, states have begun to legislate on these is-
sues. See supra note 42 (listing the various state laws which have been enacted to regulate
the use of genetic information). It is more detrimental to the interests involved in the use
of this information to have indiscriminate laws across the country. See Lin, supra note 10,
at 127, 134 (calling for a clear national policy as to the relationship between property
rights and genetics). A national standard would uniformly protect genetic information
and decrease the chances of abuse of the laws. See id.
219. See Lin, supra note 10, at 122-23 (arguing that the "lag time" of civil law suits in
relation to the rate of research lead to the conclusion that legislative action is the best way
to protect the use of genetic information). Although states have legislated to protect the
use of genetic information, the state of the law is confusing because it fails to protect pa-
tients. See id. at 127. Similarly, it fails to encourage them to consent to the use of their
genetic material for research. See id.
220. See id. at 134 (stating that the protections enacted under state law and the slowly
developing case law provide, at best, uncertain protections for the use of genetic informa-
tion). This uncertainty can be damaging because it not only affects those with genetic de-
fects, but also the biotechnological and pharmaceutical industries. See id. These indus-
tries will be unable to foster increased development and experimentation unless there is
greater protection for this material. See id.
221. See id. at 122-23 (noting the slow development of case law but accelerating pace
of genetic discoveries).
222. See id. at 122.
223. See id. at 122-23.
224. See Barrad, supra note 3, at 1084 (arguing that the courts need to resolve the is-
sues surrounding the use of genetic information using common law principles and pre-
vailing theories on property jurisprudence).
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state legislatures, this view calls for reliance on the status quo.2  Unfor-
tunately, reliance on property rights that are not precisely defined by the
• e . • 226
courts is a dangerous route to regulate the use of this information. The
pace of scientific research, coupled with increasing discrimination, calls
for a rapid response that cannot be found in a judiciary that since 1920
has ignored property rights.227
B. The Flaws in Establishing a Federal Property Right in Genetic
Information
A federal privacy right in genetic information, establishing both floor
and ceiling limitations, may alleviate some of the insurance concerns,
which cause both health insurance and employment discrimination.
Similarly, informed consent laws are state regulated; thus, they vary
widely from state to state.2 9 This variance causes confusion for patients
who frequently relocate and it causes utter chaos for the multi-state in-
surance companies because they would have to comply with fifty differ-
ent standards for informed consent.230
Such a situation is developing with the increasing number of states en-
acting genetic information legislation.21 State legislation is inconsistent,
with various states regulating health care or employment and others
regulating only genetic testing and not general genetic information.232
Therefore, those who have an interest in this information have no stan-
225. See id.
226. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text (discussing the unstable position of
property rights in American jurisprudence).
227. See id.
228. See Nuki, supra note 57 (stating that insurance companies are concerned that they
will be excluded from the "genetic revolution," thereby causing them to lose money due to
the inability to select against those with costly genetic diseases). The conflict over the use
of this information in many ways is not medical-it is driven by political and social forces.
See Arnst, supra note 54.
229. Cf. Bergman, supra note 2, at 134 (stating that the Moore Court concluded that
doctors have a general duty to inform their patients of research interests derived from
their treatment). The court based its reasoning on the principle of informed consent
which states that "a person of adult years and in sound mind has the right, in exercise of
control over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treat-
ment." Id. at 134 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972)).
230. See Lin, supra note 10, at 122 (discussing the inadequacy of the informed consent
doctrine as a solution to the conflicts arising out of the use of genetic information).
231. See Why We Need H.R. 306, supra note 11 (discussing the fact that state regula-
tion has no effect on large, multi-state insurance companies which are regulated under
ERISA).
232. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (referencing those states that have
enacted legislation pertaining to genetic issues).
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dard guidelines with which to comply."' Further, states cannot regulate
many of the larger, multi-state insurance companies because of ERISA,
thereby leaving a large number of employees unprotected.14 The best
solution is federal legislation which, at a minimum, would establish pa-• • • 235
rameters for the use of genetic information.
C. New Jersey's Statute as a Congressional Model
Congress should model its legislation after New Jersey's Genetic Pri-
vacy Act.236 The comprehensiveness of the New Jersey legislation is pro-
active and insightful.237 Despite the legislation only addressing one inter-
est involved in regulating genetic testing,238 the tension between property
versus privacy rights should not be the focus because neither protection
alone can adequately protect genetic information.239 Instead of manipu-
lating genetic information to fit into one classification or another, the
classifications should be tailored to the character of genetic information.
If the ambiguous nature of a property right is used as an opportunity for
definition and the constitutional protection afforded to privacy rights is
used to stabilize the status of genetic information, a middle ground is
achievable and the courts can address the remaining issues through
common law.
V. CONCLUSION
Through continuing advances in genetic technology, scientists will have
mapped the entire human genome by the year 2005, linking genetic de-
233. See Myk Cherskov, Fighting Genetic Discrimination, 78 A.B.A. J. 38 (1992)
(stating that states with genetic discrimination laws typically prohibit discrimination
against individuals with specific genetic disorders and that laws prohibiting discrimination
based on genetic information are rare).
234. See Why We Need H.R. 306, supra note 11.
235. See id. (discussing proposed legislation relating solely to health insurance dis-
crimination, but emphasizing the need for federal legislation); see also Lin, supra note 10,
at 126-27 (discussing why federal legislation provides a more feasible solution to the regu-
lation of genetic information than state legislation).
236. See id. (discussing proposed legislation relating solely to health insurance dis-
crimination, but emphasizing the need for federal legislation); see also Lin, supra note 10,
at 126-27 (discussing why federal legislation provides a more feasible solution to the regu-
lation of genetic information than state legislation).
237. See supra notes 105-113 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of New
Jersey's Genetic Privacy Act and stating that the purpose of the Act is to end insurance
discrimination).
238. See News Release, supra note 104; see also Lin, supra note 10 (listing various in-
terests involved in regulating the use of genetic information).
239. See supra notes 218-26 and accompanying text (discussing the attributes of prop-
erty and privacy rights).
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fects to all "abnormalities" ranging from Down's Syndrome to alcohol-
ism. While it is unreasonable to expect the judiciary to develop legal
precedent contemporaneously with all technological advances, it cannot
remain a mere passive bystander. This is a task for the federal legislature
rather than the state legislatures. The varying state legislation dealing
with insurance or employment discrimination is based on variant theories
and only further muddles the issue. The federal government must estab-
lish laws creating a framework within which insurance companies and
employers can function while sufficiently protecting the individual.
The New Jersey Genetic Privacy Act provides an effective model on
which to base a national policy. While Congress may elect to begin tack-
ling this issue by dealing with the relationship between health care insur-
ance and genetic information, New Jersey's legislation represents the
trend which any federal legislation should follow. Sooner, rather than
later, the legal system must integrate this phenomenal ability to discover
new genetic information into a framework whereby society can accept its
genetic defects without facing widespread discrimination.
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